
16
The Dynamics of Variable Renewable Energy Integration:
A Multi-Dimensional Framework for Future Power Systems
disproportionally (arbitrage eect). Owners of these
technologies prefer to engage in real-time operations
rather than day-head markets in energy-only markets;
therefore, the incentives for market engagement are
changing (Fabra 2023). In addition, balancing costs are
changing as the uncertainty in the availability of VREs
in real-time is increasing, and the availability of existing
storage investments is not compensating for the decrease
in dispatchable generation. As a result, operational
and financial implications of VREs are dierent in terms
of revenue certainty and impact on the market than
dispatchable technologies.
Along with changing incentive structure, risks also change
with the diusion of intermittent technologies. The first
major risk is the liquidity risk. Market liquidity refers
to the ease with which assets can be traded without
causing significant price changes, and liquid markets
are necessary for ecient price formation. However,
change in market interconnectedness and less market
participation could reduce liquidity in forward markets
and limit short-term market eciency (Pollitt et al. 2024).
In addition to the liquidity, the increase in the number
of small-scale generators with intermittent technologies
increases the counterparty risk for hedging, due to their
limited scale and uncertain generation profile. While the
aggregated management of these technologies reduces
liquidity and counterparty risks theoretically, this can also
create local market power, especially in nodes or local
zones with a few major generators and multiple small-
scale VRE investors.
Another emerging problem is the existence of multiple
potential market equilibria under increasing storage and
intermittent generation (Grübel et al. 2020). Multiple
market equilibria present a significant challenge in
economic theory, as it complicates the prediction and
analysis of economic outcomes.8 The existence of
multiple equilibria is due to the unique characteristics
of the electricity sector including various idiosyncratic
generation technologies, network constraints, and
countless bidding possibilities. This phenomenon creates
substantial diculties for system operators because
it introduces indeterminacy and uncertainty regarding
system operations. Since real-time and forward markets
have interconnected characteristics, the presence of
multiple equilibria creates several problems for pricing
mechanisms and settlement procedures (Sun et al. 2021).
The change in competitive behavior and emerging
incentives for anticompetitive practices due to declining
profitability and increasing complexity is another
problem. Competition and exercise of market power
has always been a soft spot in electricity market design,
and it has been one of the extensively explored topics
in the literature (Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak 2002;
Borenstein and Bushnell 2022; Fabra, von der Fehr, and
Harbord 2010; Hortaçsu and Puller 2008; Mansur 2008;
Puller 2007; Borenstein and Bushnell 2015). As more VREs
become integrated to the grid, it is expected that the
positive shift in the supply curve (the merit-order eect)
will reduce opportunities for exercising market power;
however, this also depends on the market context and
the ownership of generation and storage assets (Fabra,
2021; Andrés-Cerezo and Fabra 2023). Recent studies
have highlighted that the positive eect of VREs on
market competition can be oset by bidding behavior
of strategic players with conventional resources (Bahn
Samano, and Sarkis 2021; Batlle Pérez-Arriaga, and
Zambrano-Barragán 2012; Ciarreta, Espinosa, and Pizarro-
Irizar 2017; Acemoğlu , Kakhbod, and Ozdaglar 2017;
Fabra 2021; Genc and Reynolds 2019; Ito and Reguant
2016; Kakhbod, Ozdaglar, and Schneider 2021).
Furthermore, the increasing share of VREs is changing
the incentives at the transmission system operations.
Intrazonal transmission constraints are not taken into
account in many decentralized electricity markets, and
this incentivizes agents to engage in strategic bidding
(capacity withholding or financial withholding), create
transmission constraints, and exercise of market power
at constrained times to take advantage of spatial and
temporal arbitrage opportunities (Pollitt 2023).
The change in short-term dynamics also aects long-
term dynamics, and the most crucial issue has been
changing resource adequacy needs, ensuring available
capacity to meet expected demand, and sustaining
investments in the long term. Theoretically, energy-only
markets are expected to create investment incentives
that will create the optimal generation mix in the long
run (Joskow 2021; Keppler, Quemin, and Saguan 2022).
However, the missing-money problem has always been
an issue in energy-only market designs, and this problem
can be partially solved by introducing additional support
and remuneration mechanisms (Blazquez, Fuentes,
and Manzano 2020; Bublitz et al. 2019; Joskow 2021;
Newbery 2016). As a result of declining average prices
and increasing system reliability needs, less flexible base
load technologies are being adversely aected, either
reducing output or completely leaving the market.