Limiting Carbon
Dioxide Removal
Could Exacerbate
Global Economic
Inequality
Discussion Paper
Raphael Apeaning, Puneet Kamboj,
and Mohamad Hejazi
April 2025 I Doi: 10.30573/KS--2025-DP07
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3Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Abstract
The Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting global warming to well below
2 degrees Celsius (°C), and ideally 1.5°C, above pre-industrial levels, places
significant emphasis on carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies. However,
the global landscape for CDR deployment remains uneven, with significant
disparities in technological capacity, economic readiness, and regional
ambition. This study investigates how limited access to CDR technologies
could exacerbate global economic inequality under a 1.5°C pathway. Using
the Global Change Analysis Model (GCAM v6.0), six scenarios – ranging from
unrestricted CDR availability to constrained deployment – are evaluated. Our
findings reveal that constrained CDR availability significantly increases median
global carbon prices, rising from US$588 per ton of carbon dioxide (tCO2) in
the full CDR portfolio scenario to $937/tCO2 by 2055 in the most restrictive
scenario. By 2100, some regions will face prices exceeding $3,000/tCO2,
underscoring stark regional inequalities. These elevated carbon prices could
deepen economic disparities, particularly in developing nations and fossil fuel-
dependent economies. Furthermore, constrained CDR availability could also
amplify inequalities in energy and food security, disproportionately aecting
poorer regions. The study underscores the need for equitable CDR access
to support a just global transition to a low-carbon future, oering valuable
insights for policymakers designing more equitable climate strategies.
Keywords: Carbon Dioxide Removal, Economic Inequality, Equitable Climate Policy
4Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
1. Introduction
The Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting global warming to well below
2 degrees Celsius (°C), and ideally 1.5°C, above pre-industrial levels has
elevated carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies to a critical role in
climate mitigation action (Fuss 2014; Smith et al. 2016). Despite criticisms
centered on the immaturity of CDR and concerns that it might divert attention
from immediate emission reduction eorts, there is growing consensus
that large-scale deployment will be essential in meeting the Paris targets
(Ganti et al. 2024; Lamb et al. 2024; Andreoni, Emmerling, and Tavoni 2023;
McLaren 2020). The increasing focus on CDR is also driven by the fact that
many scenarios aligned with the Paris Agreement rely on multi-gigaton-
scale CDR deployment to stabilize the climate within safe limits (Tamme and
Beck 2021; Powis et al. 2023). As global emissions continue to rise, CDRs
are recognized as crucial for osetting residual emissions, particularly from
hard-to-abate sectors, and for addressing potential temperature overshoots
(Iyer et al. 2018; Creutzig et al. 2019; Smith, Vaughan, and Forster 2024).
Consequently, CDR has transitioned from a theoretical concept to an
indispensable element of national and regional decarbonization strategies,
essential for achieving significant emission reductions (McMullin et al. 2020).
However, the global landscape for CDR deployment
remains uneven, with significant disparities in
technological capacity, economic readiness, and regional
ambition (Minx et al. 2018; Powis et al. 2023). These
variations are evident in the long-term low-emission
development strategies (LT-LEDS) submitted by various
nations, where pathways for CDR implementation dier
markedly (Smith, Vaughan, and Forster 2024; McMullin
et al. 2020; Lamb et al. 2024; Buylova et al. 2021).
This divergence represents the uncertainties about
the economic feasibility, scalability, and biophysical
constraints of dierent CDR technologies across regions
(Geden and Schenuit 2020).
There are many challenges to scaling CDR technologies,
particularly in less wealthy regions (Bednar, Obersteiner,
and Wagner 2019). High upfront investments in
technologies like direct air capture (DAC) and bioenergy
with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) create
financial barriers, especially in regions without advanced
technological infrastructure or access to robust financial
systems (Nemet et al. 2018; Bednar, Obersteiner, and
Wagner 2019). Moreover, the eectiveness of CDR
technologies hinges on the availability of supporting
infrastructure, such as carbon capture and storage (CCS),
which is costly to develop and unevenly distributed
globally (Galán-Martín et al. 2021; Kazlou, Cherp, and
Jewell 2024). Beyond economic constraints, biophysical
limitations – such as land and water availability – also
pose significant challenges to the scalability of many
CDR technologies (Smith et al. 2016; Fuhrman et al. 2020,
2023). These limitations may exacerbate tensions around
the use of land for carbon removal rather than other
critical needs, such as food production, particularly in
developing regions (Fuhrman et al. 2020, 2023; Deprez
et al. 2024).
5Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
As countries intensify their eorts to meet the Paris
Agreement’s 1.5°C target through enhanced emission
reductions and large-scale CDR initiatives, concerns
about economic inequality have grown (Iyer et al.
2018; Pozo et al. 2022; Andreoni, Emmerling, and
Tavoni 2023). These concerns stem from pronounced
disparities in regional capacities to deploy CDR
technologies, raising critical policy issues around
equity and justice in global climate mitigation eorts
(Sovacool, Baum, and Low 2023; Fyson et al. 2020).
Addressing these risks and challenges is imperative
to ensure progress toward climate goals is equitable.
In this context, our study examines the implications of
limited CDR deployment on global economic inequality,
filling a critical gap in the literature. Using the Global
Change Analysis Model (GCAM version 6.0), we explore
six distinct scenarios reflecting varying degrees of
CDR limitations – from unconstrained technological
availability to restrictions on CDR portfolios and
enabling resources (see Table 1 in Section 2 for detailed
explanations). The CDR technology scenarios are
modeled under region-specific climate action pathways
targeting the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C goal. By analyzing
CDR deployment across varying ambition levels and
resource constraints, we assess how unequal access to
CDR – driven by key limiting factors – can exacerbate
regional economic disparities. Our findings underscore
that without a comprehensive suite of CDR options and
supportive policies, achieving regional decarbonization
targets could become prohibitively expensive,
jeopardizing the feasibility of meeting long-term climate
goals. Moreover, limitations on CDR can exacerbate
energy and food security inequality, disproportionately
impacting poorer regions. This highlights the critical
role of CDR in complementing traditional mitigation
strategies to address existing gaps and ensure a more
equitable transition to a low-carbon future. Overall,
these insights are critical for designing more equitable
and inclusive global climate strategies and contribute
to ongoing policy dialogues on achieving climate goals
without increasing regional inequalities (Fyson et al.
2020; Lee, Fyson, and Schleussner 2021; Carton, Lund,
and Dooley 2021).
The study is structured as follows: The Methodology
section outlines the scenarios and model used, the
Results section presents key findings, and the Discussion
and Conclusion section outlines their implications.
6Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
2. Methodology
2.1 GCAM Overview
We applied the Global Change Analysis Model (GCAM version 6.0) to
evaluate six CDR scenarios under regionalized decarbonization pathways.
The pathways aim to limit the average global temperature to 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels by 2100. GCAM is an open-source, integrated assessment
model that captures the complex interactions across global systems including
energy, economy, land use, water, and climate (Calvin et al. 2019). It covers
32 geopolitical regions, with detailed representations of energy, agriculture,
land allocation, and water use across 384 land subregions and 235 water
basins. GCAM operates in five-year time steps from 2015 to 2100, dynamically
solving for equilibrium prices and quantities across energy, agriculture, land,
and water markets, while also tracking the emissions of 24 greenhouse
gases, short-lived climate pollutants, and ozone precursors. As a dynamic
recursive model, GCAM bases the decisions in each period on current market
conditions, without perfect foresight of future changes. Model outcomes are
driven by exogenous assumptions of population growth, labor productivity,
resources, technologies, and climate policies specific to each region. Under
climate-constrained scenarios, GCAM’s economic agents choose between
mitigation strategies, such as fuel switching, energy eciency improvements,
carbon capture, and CDR technologies, to meet regional or global
emission targets.
In our study, we evaluate regional carbon pricing and
the associated policy costs across various GCAM
scenarios. GCAM estimates welfare losses from
climate policies through a deadweight loss approach.
It does so by calibrating marginal abatement costs
based on endogenous carbon prices and the resulting
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions driven
by technological and socio-economic factors (Peng
et al. 2021). The marginal abatement cost curve
is divided into five carbon price intervals for each
period (i.e., 0%-20%, 20%-40%, 40%-60%, 60%-80%,
and 80%-100%). Deadweight losses are assessed
by comparing emissions under carbon pricing to a
baseline without such a policy. Mitigation costs are
determined by calculating the area under the marginal
abatement curve; eectively integrating carbon prices
over the range of emission reductions influenced by
the policy.
7Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
2.2 Carbon Capture
and Storage
and Bioenergy
Resources in GCAM
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is modeled extensively
in GCAM across multiple sectors, including electricity
generation, refining, industry, and hydrogen production
(Muratori et al. 2017). Technologies such as pulverized
coal with CCS, natural gas combined cycle with CCS, and
integrated gasification combined cycle with CCS compete
with other technologies based on their levelized costs.
The latter include capital, operation, maintenance, fuel,
and emission costs. The availability of CCS is modeled
regionally, reflecting local resource availability, storage
capacity, and economic conditions. The model also
accounts for the transportation and storage of CO2,
incorporating regional variations in storage costs
and infrastructure needs. CCS plays a critical role in
decarbonizing fossil fuel-based energy systems, as
well as in BECCS and DAC systems (see Figure S2 for a
comparison of this study’s CCS output with the AR6 1.5°C
scenarios).
In GCAM, bioenergy resources are represented as part
of the integrated energy and agriculture-land system,
where bioenergy crops compete with food crops, forests,
pasture, and other land uses. Land use is allocated based
on its expected profitability, factoring in crop yields,
market prices and production costs. GCAM models
bioenergy conversion from various sources, including
dedicated bioenergy crops, agricultural residues, and
forestry by-products. Bioenergy is primarily used for
electricity generation, refining, and hydrogen production.
It can also be coupled with CCS to form BECCS, which
generates negative emissions by sequestering CO2.
It is essential to emphasize that GCAM incorporates
externality constraints on land use to mitigate
unsustainable bioenergy deployment. These constraints
help align bioenergy production with environmental
and sustainability goals. This ensures that bioenergy
expansion is balanced with other land-use priorities,
supporting more sustainable development pathways.
GCAM’s bioenergy system is tightly linked to the
agricultural sector. The production of bioenergy aects
land allocation, food prices, and agricultural trade, with
potential consequences for food security and ecosystem
services. The competition between bioenergy and other
agricultural uses of land is influenced by policy incentives,
regional land use regulations, and market conditions,
making bioenergy a key component of GCAM’s energy
and agricultural systems.
2.3 CDR Technology
Portfolio in GCAM
This study examines five key CDR technologies –
namely, aorestation/reforestation (AF/RF), BECCS,
DAC, enhanced weathering (EW), and biochar. In GCAM,
these technologies are uniquely represented. The
category of AF/RF includes both the establishment of
forests on lands that were not previously forested and
the replanting of forests on deforested lands. This dual
approach is incentivized through policies that assign a
value to land use CO2 emissions, eectively integrating
the forest-based carbon sequestration benefits into an
economic framework (Zhao et al. 2024). Within GCAM,
aorestation competes with other land uses, such as
agriculture and bioenergy production (Calvin et al.
2019). This competition is influenced by carbon pricing
mechanisms, which aect the relative profitability of
dierent land uses. BECCS integrates across multiple
sectors, including refining, electricity, and hydrogen
production, combining bioenergy with carbon
capture and storage to achieve negative emissions
by sequestering CO2 from biomass combustion (see
tables S3 and S4 for the cost assumptions of BECCS
technologies) (Muratori et al. 2017; Zhao et al. 2024). DAC
is modeled with three archetypes – high temperature
(natural gas-based), electric heat-driven, and low
temperature (using heat pumps) – to capture CO2
directly from the atmosphere. Regional deployment
is influenced by technology costs, energy inputs, and
storage capacity (Fuhrman et al. 2020, 2023). EW is
modeled based on the energy required for rock grinding
and transport, with regional cost curves reflecting the
available resources and infrastructure (Fuhrman et al.
2023). Lastly, biochar, produced via the slow pyrolysis
of biomass, enhances the capacity for carbon storage
in soil (Fuhrman et al. 2023; Bergero et al. 2024).
The model captures the competition between using
biomass for biochar versus other energy production
methods, such as BECCS. It also considers biochar’s
carbon sequestration potential over centuries, along
with additional benefits like improved crop yields,
which depend on local irrigation and climate conditions
(Bergero et al. 2024). In GCAM, the deployment of these
8Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
CDR technologies is driven by economic factors, policy
incentives, and technological advancements, alongside
other mitigation strategies such as renewable energy
adoption and energy eciency improvements (see
tables S3-S7 for details about the CDR parameters). The
model captures the trade-os between CDR and other
emission reduction options, oering a comprehensive
view of how dierent regions can achieve their
climate targets.
2.4 Measuring
Inequality
This analysis employs the mean log deviation (MLD)
metric, a measure of income inequality rooted in
information theory, to quantify distribution disparities.
The MLD is particularly suitable for decomposing total
inequality into its constituent components, allowing
for a detailed examination of the sources of inequality.
Unlike other measures, such as the Gini coecient,
the MLD is sensitive to changes across the entire
distribution (Cowell and Flachaire 2023). This makes it
ideal for evaluating disparities in policy costs or income
levels where both within-region and between-region
dierences matter.
As part of the generalized entropy (GE) class of
indices, the MLD is derived from information theory
and captures relative disparities by measuring the
distance” of individual or subgroup values from their
respective means. Its additive decomposability enables
a clear separation of total inequality into inter-regional
and intra-regional components, providing insights into
whether disparities arise from local dierences within
regions or broader structural imbalances between
regions. In other words, the inter-regional component
quantifies inequality between regions by comparing
the mean value of each region to the global mean.
The intra-regional component quantifies inequality
within regions by averaging the deviations of individual
values within a region from that region’s mean. This
decomposition enables policymakers and researchers
to isolate the drivers of inequality into both regional and
global disparities eectively. It also provides a robust
framework for evaluating the inequality implications
of climate policy scenarios. Equations 1, 2 and 3 show
the total and subcomponents of MLD expressed
mathematically as:
    𝑀𝐿𝐷𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝑀𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝑀𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎 Equation (1)
Where:
MLDinter: Quantifies inequality between regions by
comparing each region’s mean per capita value to the
global mean.
MLDintra: Quantifies inequality within regions by averaging
the disparities of individuals or subgroups relative to their
region’s mean.
Equation (2)
MLDintra
=
1
Rr
=
1
R
1
Nri
=
1
Nr
ln
yr
yi
,
r
Equation (3)
Where :
R: Total number of regions.
y
: Global mean per capita policy cost.
yr
: Mean per capita policy cost in region r.
yi,r: Per capita policy cost for individual i in region r.
Nr: Number of individuals in region r.
2.5 Scenario Design
The study examines various scenarios to assess the
impact of CDR technology limitations on emissions
reduction strategies. The FullTech scenario serves
as a benchmark, oering maximum flexibility with no
restrictions on CDR. In contrast, the CCS50 scenario
restricts CCS deployment to 50% capacity, evaluating
how relying on engineering CDR technologies like CCS
may impact the achievement of emission goals.
Although the 50% limitation may appear arbitrary, it
is intended to reflect real-world constraints such as
technological readiness, economic feasibility, and
societal acceptance, which can impede full-scale CCS
implementation. The Bio100 scenario limits global
bioenergy usage to 100 exajoules (EJ) per year and
explores how this constraint aects the capacity for
negative emissions from BECCS and biochar. The
100 EJ limit on bioenergy reflects assessments of
sustainable biomass availability, considering biophysical
constraints such as land and water resources. The limit
is aimed at balancing climate mitigation eorts with
ecological and socio-economic considerations like
food security and biodiversity conservation (Creutzig
et al. 2014). The LimCDR scenario excludes novel
9Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Table 1. Scenario description.
Scenario Description Key CDR limitations Objective/insight
FullTech No limitations on CDR or CCS
technologies, providing maximum
flexibility for emissions reduction. All
technologies are available.
None. Benchmark for maximum
potential of negative
emissions.
CCS50 Similar to FullTech but with CCS
deployment restricted to 50%
capacity, exploring the eect of
limited CCS availability.
CCS capacity limited
to 50%.
Assess reliance on CCS
for emissions goals.
Bio100 Mirrors FullTech but limits bioenergy
to 100 EJ, evaluating how restricted
bioenergy impacts negative
emissions capacity.
Bioenergy limited to
100 EJ/yr.
Impact of limited
bioenergy on BECCS
and biochar.
LimCDR Limits the CDR portfolio by excluding
newer technologies like enhanced
weathering (EW) and direct air
capture (DAC).
No EW or DAC. Eects of a restricted
CDR portfolio.
LimCDR+CCS50 Combines a limited CDR portfolio
(no EW or DAC) with CCS capacity
restricted to 50%.
Limited CDR
options; CCS
at 50%.
Impact of limited CDR
and reduced CCS on
emissions goals.
LimCDR+Bio100 Limits both CDR technologies (no EW
and DAC) and bioenergy capacity
to 100 EJ, assessing combined
technology and resource constraints
Limited CDR
options; bioenergy
at 100 EJ/yr.
Dual impact of resource
and technology
constraints.
Note: yr = year.
CDR technologies such as EW and DAC to assess the
eects of a restricted CDR portfolio. This exclusion is
based on the relatively high costs, energy intensity,
and current technological immaturity of EW and DAC
compared to more established options like BECCS
and biochar. Further, the LimCDR+CCS50 scenario
combines the limitations of LimCDR with a 50%
2.6 Climate Pathway
and Socio-Economic
Assumptions
This studys regional emissions constraint design builds
upon methodologies from Iyer et al. (2022), integrating
the latest nationally determined contributions (NDCs),
restriction on CCS capacity, analyzing the compounded
impact on emissions reduction objectives. Lastly,
the LimCDR+Bio100 scenario imposes a limited CDR
portfolio (excluding EW and DAC) and a bioenergy
cap of 100 EJ per year to evaluate the dual impact
of resource and technology constraints on achieving
emissions targets.
long-term strategies (LTS), net-zero pledges, and post-
2030 decarbonization trajectories. All scenarios are
modeled under the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 2
(SSP2), which represents a “middle-of-the-road” scenario
where social, economic, and technological trends follow
historical patterns (Fricko et al. 2017).
In the near term, the study assumes countries will
implement their NDCs, aligning regional emissions
with the current climate commitments. Using the NDCs
10Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
allows us reflect the varying levels of commitment
and capability across regions, acknowledging diverse
starting points and climate ambitions globally. Long-
term emissions trajectories incorporate LTS and
net-zero pledges. Countries with explicit long-term
strategies or net-zero commitments follow linear
reductions to their target years, typically 2050, after
which emissions stabilize. For countries without defined
long-term strategies, a post-2030 decarbonization rate
of 5% is applied, representing a moderately ambitious
level of emissions reduction (see Table S1 for more
details about post-2030 decarbonization assumptions).
This ensures that regions without formal long-term
pathways still contribute meaningfully to global
mitigation eorts, balancing realistic projections with
uncertainties around future commitments (Grant 2022;
Baptista et al. 2022). Following Ou et al. (2021) and
Iyer et al. (2022), the decarbonization rate is calculated
based on the carbon intensity of gross domestic
product (GDP).
The regionalized emission constraints framework
enables the exploration of global 1.5°C pathways under
varying assumptions and ambition levels, oering
insights into how regions can achieve their climate
targets. By simulating a “second-best world” without
emissions trading, the modeling exercise highlights the
challenges regions might face due to diering economic
and technological capacities (Bauer et al. 2020). This
approach provides a realistic view of the complexities of
achieving global climate goals under stricter regulations
and limited international cooperation. Overall, the design
of the technology and emissions reduction scenarios
highlights the necessity for tailored, region-specific
strategies. This is because regions must depend on
their own resources and capacities to implement CDR
technologies and achieve decarbonization targets.
This approach highlights the significance of customized
climate action plans, providing a nuanced perspective on
how varying regional capabilities influence global climate
outcomes (Rogelj et al. 2019).
11Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
3. Results
3.1 Emission and Carbon Dioxide Removal
Technology Profiles
Figure 1a illustrates the emission profiles for the regionalized decarbonization
scenarios aimed at meeting the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C target (see the
Methodology section for details). The results demonstrate the pivotal role
of CDR technologies in achieving this ambitious climate goal. Global net
greenhouse gas emissions peak around 2030 and then rapidly decline,
reaching net zero by 2055. During this period, CDR deployment scales up
substantially, rising from 1.31 gigatons of CO2 (GtCO2) to 1.67 GtCO2 per year
(GtCO2/yr) in 2030 to 8.5 GtCO2 to 10.7 GtCO2/yr by 2055. The scale-up of
CDR highlights the increasing reliance on it in regional mitigation strategies.
Beyond the net-zero year, residual emissions stabilize between 10.5 GtCO2
and 21.9 GtCO2/yr, depending on the scenario (Figure 1b). Continued
CDR deployment beyond net zero is essential for achieving net-negative
emissions, which is crucial for keeping the global temperature rise under the
1.5°C threshold (Johansson et al. 2020; DeAngelo et al. 2021).
In the FullTech scenario, which assumes unrestricted
access to CDR technologies, gross CDR deployment
rises from 11.5 GtCO2/yr in 2055 to 17.8 GtCO2/yr by 2100
(Figure 1b). In contrast, scenarios with restricted CDR
show more moderate growth, starting at lower levels of
8.5-10.6 GtCO2/yr by 2055. Among the engineering CDR
solutions, BECCS is the largest contributor, accounting
for 42.4%-63.9% of gross CDR in 2055, followed by
DAC (5.3%-11.9%), biochar (4.1%-6.3%), and EW (4.2%-
6.3%). Land-use-based CDR, primarily aorestation,
plays a significant role in achieving net-zero emissions,
contributing 27.7%-47.3% of gross CDR, with a greater
contribution in scenarios where DAC and EW are
unavailable. Regional CDR deployment varies widely.
By 2055, the United States (U.S.) (17.8%), China (11.78%),
and the EU-15 (8.3%) lead in the FullTech scenario (see
Figure S2). By 2100, the distribution shifts, with China
(15.13%), the U.S. (12.83%), and the Middle East (6.74%)
emerging as major contributors, reflecting evolving
regional capacities and demand for CDR technologies.
12Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Figure 1. 1.5°C emissions and CDR profiles.
Source: Authors.
Note: LUC = Land use change ; Other Energy Trans. = Other energy transformation
a. Sectoral emissions trajectories from 2020 to 2100 across six scenarios, showing contributions from industry, transportation, electricity, and carbon
removal technologies (e.g., BECCS, DAC, aorestation). The dashed vertical line marks the net-zero year (2055), while the purple and black solid lines
represent global net CO₂ and GHG emissions, respectively.
b. Total residual emissions (left) and gross CDR deployment (right) from 2020 to 2100. The dashed vertical line indicates the net-zero year (2055).
13Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
3.2 Sectoral
Implications of
Limited CDR
Availability
Limited availability of CDR technologies profoundly
influences mitigation strategies across sectors. Compared
to the FullTech scenario (see Figure 2b), scenarios with
CDR constraints exhibit significant shifts in deployment
patterns. BECCS deployment is notably reduced – by
35.3% to 37.3% relative to FullTech – while biochar
utilization increases by 5.7% to 22% in the net-zero year.
Aorestation also rises sharply in scenarios where DAC
and EW are unavailable, compensating for the limited
CDR portfolio. Moreover, when all CDR technologies
are available, constraints on CCS and bioenergy further
hinder the deployment of BECCS, DAC, and EW, thereby
reducing their overall contributions to carbon removal.
The availability – or limitation – of CDR has a substantial
impact on sectoral emissions, particularly in hard-to-
abate sectors such as industry and transportation.
Under restricted CDR availability, the industrial sector
must reduce its emissions by an additional 2% to
11.5% by 2055 compared to the FullTech scenario; this
increases to 52.5% to 69.2% by 2100 (Figure 2a). The
transportation sector, which heavily relies on CDR due to
limited decarbonization alternatives, faces even steeper
reductions – ranging from 5.1% to 24.2% by 2055, and
66.5% to 86.1% by 2100.
Additionally, energy transformation sectors, such
as electricity generation, experience significant
constraints on their decarbonization potential
under limited CDR availability. The stifling of BECCS
deployment aects the cost-eectiveness of
decarbonizing electricity, refined liquids, and hydrogen
production. These findings underscore the critical
trade-os in CDR technology deployment, illustrating
how technological limitations shape the pathways to
achieving climate targets.
14Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Figure 2. Impact of constrained CDR on residual emissions and CDR contributions.
Source: Authors.
Note: LUC = land use change; Other energy trans. = other energy transformation
a. Percentage deviations in sectoral emission reductions due to constrained CDR availability, compared to the FullTech scenario, shown for the net-
zero year (2055) and 2100.
b. Contributions of CDR technologies in limited CDR scenarios compared to FullTech for 2055 and 2100. Gray cells indicate scenarios where specific
CDR technologies are unavailable.
3.3 Carbon Price
Implications
The limited availability of CDR technologies significantly
hinders emission reductions in sectors with limited
decarbonization options. Consequently, these hard-to-
abate sectors are compelled to rely on less cost-eective
mitigation strategies to oset their residual emissions
(Riahi et al. 2021; De Cian et al. 2016; Grant et al. 2021).
Our modeling results in Figure 3 demonstrate that
constraints on CDR technologies lead to an elevated
shadow price of carbon, resulting in the increased
heterogeneity of carbon prices across regions as they
strive to meet ambitious climate goals under technological
15Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
limitations. This variation in carbon prices highlights
the diering regional impacts of and responses to CDR
limitations, with some areas facing significantly higher
economic burdens.
Figure 3a reveals that the median regional carbon
price falls between $50 and $104 per tonne of CO2
(tCO2) in 2025. By 2055, as emission reduction
commitments intensify, these prices rise sharply, with
significant variation across scenarios. In scenarios with
restricted CDR deployment – such as LimCDR, CCS50,
LimCDR+CCS50, Bio100, and LimCDR+Bio100 – the
median carbon price increases to $679, $817, $821, $848,
and $937 tCO2, respectively. By comparison, the FullTech
scenario, which assumes unrestricted CDR access,
maintains a lower median carbon price of $588/tCO2. By
2100, carbon prices in the constrained CDR scenarios
escalate further, ranging from $1,318 to $2,190/tCO2, while
FullTech remains the most cost-eective, with a carbon
price of $628/tCO2.
Additionally, the spread of regional carbon prices,
represented by interquartile ranges (IQRs), expands
considerably in scenarios with limited CDR availability.
By the net-zero year, the IQR for the carbon price in
constrained scenarios ranges from $198 to $298/tCO2,
reflecting significant regional price variation. In contrast,
the FullTech scenario shows a narrower IQR of $142/
tCO2, indicating more uniform pricing across regions
due to the broader availability of mitigation options. By
2100, this disparity becomes even more pronounced,
with scenarios such as Bio100 and LimCDR+Bio100
reaching IQRs of $479 and $643/tCO2, respectively,
while FullTech remains relatively stable with an IQR of
$193/tCO2.
These disparities in carbon prices highlight substantial
regional inequalities, carrying significant implications
for global economic inequality, especially in developing
regions. As shown in Figure 3b, regions such as Africa
and parts of Asia face disproportionately higher carbon
prices under constrained scenarios like LimCDR,
LimCDR+CCS50, and LimCDR+Bio100. For instance,
under the LimCDR+Bio100 scenario, Eastern Africa faces
carbon prices as high as $3,059/tCO2 by 2100, while
South Asia reaches $2,909/tCO2. In contrast, developed
regions, such as the U.S., experience lower carbon prices,
peaking at $1,871/tCO2 under the same scenario.
These exceptionally high carbon prices not only
underscore regional inequalities but also raise critical
questions about the practical feasibility of achieving
region-specific emission goals with limited CDR
availability. Prices in excess of $3,000/tCO2 represent
a significant economic burden that many developing
regions are unlikely to sustain, potentially rendering these
mitigation pathways unachievable without substantial
international support. It is crucial that climate policies are
economically feasible, particularly in regions with limited
fiscal capacity, and that policy frameworks align ambitious
mitigation goals with economic realities.
The stark dierences in regional carbon prices between
constrained and unrestricted CDR scenarios highlight
the essential role of a comprehensive CDR technology
portfolio in mitigating feasibility challenges (see Table S2
for more details about the regional carbon prices).
Investing in equitable access to CDR technologies
could help lower global carbon prices, making
ambitious climate targets more economically viable
for developing regions.
16Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Figure 3. Projected carbon prices and their regional distribution (2020-2100).
Source: Authors.
a. Projected global carbon prices from 2020 to 2100. Solid lines represent the median carbon price for each scenario, i.e., the central estimate of the
regional carbon price distribution. The shaded areas denote the interquartile range (IQR), capturing the middle 50% of values between the 25th and
75th percentiles. This provides a measure of regional price variability within each scenario.
b. Regional carbon prices for 2055 (top) and 2100 (bottom). Separate carbon price scales are used for each year to emphasize interregional
dierences. The scales for 2055 and 2100 should be interpreted independently.
17Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
3.4 Global and
Contextual
Implications of
Economic Inequality
The dynamics and disparities in carbon pricing outcomes
become particularly evident when assessed through the
lens of the per capita policy cost of emissions mitigation
(Fremstad and Paul 2019). Globally, per capita policy
cost inequality is shaped by a combination of regional
policies, economic structures, and diering mitigation and
CDR deployment strategies. Figure 4 (a to c) illustrates
the inequality of global and regional per capita policy
costs, expressed as the mean log deviation (MLD),
where higher MLD values indicate greater inequality.
This metric provides comprehensive insights into how
various scenarios influence inequality within and between
regions, enhancing our understanding of the broader
economic impacts of carbon pricing strategies.
The FullTech scenario, characterized by a relatively low
carbon price trajectory, results in the lowest levels of
inequality (see Figure 4a). In contrast, scenarios with
limited CDR deployment lead to substantial increases
in inequality, with disparities rising by 13.2% to 40.7%
compared to FullTech. These gaps are most pronounced
in the years immediately following the net-zero target,
peaking between 9.8% and 28.9% by 2100 (see Figure S7
in the appendix). Notably, within-region inequality is
greater than between-region inequality, highlighting
that national factors – such as policy design, economic
structure, and CDR capacity – drive inequality more than
interregional dierences.
A comparison of OECD and non-OECD regions reveals
a distinct pattern, where OECD countries exhibit
consistently lower levels of inequality across all scenarios.
Under limited CDR deployment, inequality in OECD
regions rises modestly, by 10.8% to 32.7%. In contrast,
non-OECD regions experience more pronounced
increases, ranging from 12.4% to 44.6%. This disparity
suggests that OECD economies are more resilient to the
economic impacts of decarbonization, benefiting from
established infrastructure, diversified energy systems,
and greater technological capacity. Non-OECD regions,
however, face greater challenges under limited CDR
scenarios, hindered by weaker economic resilience,
limited technological capabilities, and structural barriers
that impede scaling up alternative mitigation strategies.
Further distinctions arise when comparing net fossil fuel
producers and consumers. Net fossil fuel consumers
consistently show higher levels of inequality across
all scenarios, driven by their greater vulnerability to
decarbonization eorts. Reliance on fossil fuel imports
exposes these regions to higher economic costs.
External energy dependency leads to elevated transition
expenses and heightened susceptibility to energy price
fluctuations and supply disruptions. Conversely, net fossil
fuel producers, while initially displaying lower inequality,
experience a marked increase – rising by 26.3% to 78.7%
under limited CDR scenarios – compared to a smaller
increase of 12% to 41.1% for consumers. This underscores
the particular vulnerability of fossil fuel-producing
regions, whose economies heavily depend on extraction
and export revenues. CDR restrictions intensify these
challenges, complicating eorts to reduce emissions
while maintaining economic stability.
These findings underscore the crucial importance of
equitable access to CDR technologies in mitigating
economic inequalities associated with decarbonization
(Yuwono et al. 2023). Without widespread CDR
deployment, some regions could face severe economic
disadvantages in their pursuit of climate targets. The
disparities highlight the need for inclusive global
climate strategies that address both environmental
objectives and economic well-being, ensuring the
transition to a low-carbon future does not exacerbate
existing inequalities.
18Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Figure 4. Global and regional inequality in per capita policy costs.
Source: Authors.
a. Global inequality in per capita policy costs across dierent decarbonization scenarios.
b. Inequality in per capita policy costs between OECD and non-OECD regions.
c. Inequality in per capita policy costs between net fossil fuel consumers and net fossil fuel producers. All panels present the mean log deviation (MLD) of
inequality in per capita policy costs, decomposed into intraregional (within-region) and interregional (between-region) components. The intraregional
component (in orange) represents disparities within regions, while the interregional component (in green) represents dierences between regions.
MLD is used as a measure of inequality, with higher values indicating greater inequality in policy costs. It captures disparities within individual regions
and across dierent regions, providing insights into how dierent scenarios aect both local and global equity in climate policy costs. See Table S7 for
details on regional classifications.
19Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
3.5 Implications
of Limited CDR on
Household Food and
Energy Demand
Beyond their impact on mitigation policy costs, rising
carbon prices can have profound microeconomic eects,
particularly through higher food and energy costs (see
Figure S6 in the Supplementary section). Elevated carbon
prices increase production costs, which are passed on to
consumers, leading to higher prices for essential goods
like food and energy (MacDonald and Parry 2024). In
regions facing steep carbon price increases, households
may struggle to maintain food and energy consumption,
resulting in demand deficits as they adjust to rising costs.
Figure 5 (a and b) illustrates these regional impacts under
constrained CDR scenarios. Our results indicate that the
LimCDR+Bio100 scenario shows the most pronounced
reductions in food and energy demand. In this scenario,
food demand in Sub-Saharan Africa declines by up to 9%
by 2055, while Southeast Asia experiences reductions
ranging from 3.5% to 9%. These results reflect regional
economic challenges, with rising costs forcing households
with limited budgets to adjust their consumption
patterns. The reductions in food demand are largely
driven by changes in non-staple food consumption,
which is typically more elastic than staple foods. This
often leads households to substitute higher-cost items,
such as meats or processed foods, with more aordable
staples, or to reduce discretionary food purchases
altogether. Residential energy demand reductions are
substantial, with Central Asia, South America, and parts
of Africa experiencing declines of 2.5%-5.7% due to
carbon price increases tied to limited CDR availability.
These reductions are driven by the increased cost of
energy services, which forces households to adjust their
consumption patterns, particularly for non-essential or
energy-intensive activities. In regions with lower incomes,
these adjustments often reflect a reduction in energy
suciency, leading to limited access to basic energy
services like heating, cooling and lighting. These socio-
economic vulnerabilities associated with constrained
mitigation options, where households are forced to adapt
by lowering their overall energy use, can potentially
compromise well-being and quality of life.
Overall these reductions underscore the challenges for
regions with limited access to mitigation technologies,
as higher carbon prices strain essential services like
heating, cooking, lighting and food. The socio-economic
vulnerabilities exacerbated under constrained CDR
scenarios emphasize the critical need for equitable
access to carbon removal technologies and financial
support to avoid deepening regional inequalities.
20Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Figure 5. Impact of limited CDR on household energy and food demand.
Source: Authors.
a. Impact of constrained CDR on residential energy demand.
b. Impact of constrained food demand, showing deviations from FullTech. Both graphs show deviations from the FullTech scenario for the net-zero year
(2055).
21Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
4. Discussion and
Conclusion
Our study highlights the pivotal role of CDR technologies in achieving
the 1.5°C Paris Agreement climate target. It also illustrates the profound
implications of CDR availability on global and regional economic outcomes.
The scenarios demonstrate that variations in CDR deployment could lead
to significant disparities in carbon prices and economic inequalities across
regions. In essence, the limited availability of CDR technologies not only
hampers the eectiveness of regional emission reductions but also results in
elevated carbon prices, imposing additional financial burdens on regions with
limited access to advanced mitigation technologies.
Under constrained CDR scenarios, developing regions
such as Africa and parts of Asia face disproportionately
higher carbon prices. For instance, under the
LimCDR+Bio100 scenario, Eastern Africa faces carbon
prices as high as $3,059/tCO2 by 2100, while South Asia
reaches $2,909/tCO2. These exceptionally high carbon
prices not only highlight stark regional inequalities,
they also raise critical concerns about the feasibility of
achieving region-specific emission targets given the
limited financial and technological capacities of these
regions to adapt to high mitigation costs. Such burdens
can significantly hinder economic development and
eorts to reduce poverty (Shang 2023; Soergel, Kriegler,
Bodirsky et al. 2021). The disparities between regional
capabilities emphasize the need for mechanisms like
international climate finance, technology transfer, and
capacity-building initiatives to support vulnerable regions
in the global decarbonization eort (Soergel, Kriegler,
Weindl et al. 2021; Rogelj et al. 2018; Honegger et al.
2021).
Our analysis also reveals that per capita policy cost
inequality is more pronounced within regions than
between them. This suggests that national policies,
economic structures, and capacities for CDR deployment
significantly influence the distributional impacts of
decarbonization eorts. Further, the dierence in
inequalities observed between net fossil fuel producers
and consumers under constrained scenarios highlight
the contextual challenges dierent economies might
face. This highlights the importance of tailored policy
approaches that consider regional contexts and promote
just transitions (Klinsky et al. 2017).
The microeconomic impacts of limited CDR availability
also have significant social implications, particularly in
regions already facing socio-economic vulnerabilities.
Our results show that rising carbon prices can drive
up production costs for essential goods like food
and energy, reducing access to these services and
exacerbating issues such as food security in Sub-Saharan
Africa and energy poverty in Central Asia and South
America (MacDonald and Parry 2024; Soergel, Kriegler,
Bodirsky et al. 2021). This calls for social considerations
to be integrated into climate policies to prevent
further inequalities and safeguard development goals
(Leichenko and Silva 2014). Additionally, the vulnerability
of developing countries, often constrained by limited
resources and technological capacity, raises concerns
about stalled climate ambitions and potential economic
destabilization without adequate financial and institutional
support (Rickels et al. 2021). Ensuring equitable access
to a broad portfolio of mitigation technologies, including
CDR, is essential to avoid worsening regional economic
22Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
disparities and to foster inclusive participation in global
decarbonization eorts (Yuwono et al. 2023; Honegger,
Michaelowa, and Roy 2021).
Overall, our study highlights the need to integrate
CDR within broader climate policies that ensure global
equity. While CDR technologies are crucial, they
should not displace immediate emission reductions
but rather complement them to help achieve climate
goals more eectively and equitably (Fuss et al. 2014).
The deployment of a full suite of CDR technologies –
alongside aggressive emission reduction strategies –
will be essential for meeting global climate targets and
minimizing economic disparities across regions (Geden,
Peters, and Scott 2019).
In conclusion, our findings stress the importance of
designing climate policies that address regional capacity
and resource disparities while keeping mitigation eorts
central to the global transition to a low-carbon future.
Without inclusive and widespread CDR deployment, the
costs of achieving climate goals may disproportionately
fall on regions with fewer resources, intensifying existing
inequalities. Policymakers must consider the distributional
impacts of climate strategies and promote international
cooperation to ensure that the transition to a low-carbon
future is both eective and just. The policy cost inequalities
identified in constrained CDR scenarios underscore the
critical importance of distributing resources equitably,
ensuring that no region is left behind in the global eort
to limit warming to 1.5°C (IPCC 2023).
23Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
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28Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Supplementary
Figure S1. Comparison of CDR technologies with AR6 CDR projections for C1 and C2 class scenarios.
Source: Authors and Assessment Report 6 (AR6) Scenario database.
Notes: The gray lines represent the range of the AR6 model projections for carbon dioxide removal, while the colored lines show the results for the
six scenarios analyzed in this study. Note that the y-axis scales dier across the panels to illustrate the relative projections of our modeling CDR
technology output compared to the AR6 model projections. In addition, “n” represents the sample size of scenarios extracted from the AR6 database.
29Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Figure S2. Comparison of CCS and Bioenergy with AR6 projections for C1 and C2 class scenarios.
Source: Authors and Assessment Report 6 (AR6) Scenario database.
Notes: The gray lines represent the range of the AR6 model projections, while the colored lines depict results from the six scenarios analyzed in this
study. The “n” represents the sample size of scenarios extracted from the AR6 database.
Figure S3. Comparison of global temperature with AR6 projections for C1 and C2 class scenarios.
Source: Authors and Assessment Report 6 (AR6) Scenario database.
Notes: The gray lines represent the range of the AR6 model projections, while the colored lines depict the results from the six scenarios analyzed in this
study. The “n” represents the sample size of scenarios extracted from the AR6 database. The black line represents the “Baseline” scenario, illustrating
an unmitigated pathway with steadily increasing global temperatures.
30Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Figure S4. Regional distribution of residual emissions across GCAM’s 32 regions.
Source: Authors.
Notes: The top panels show emissions in 2055, while the bottom panels display emissions in 2100 for six dierent decarbonization scenarios. The
intensity of the shading indicates the scale of residual emissions, with darker regions representing higher levels of remaining emissions post-mitigation
eorts.
31Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Figure S5. Regional distribution of residual emissions across GCAM’s 32 regions for various decarbonization scenarios.
Source: Authors.
Notes: The top panels represent residual emissions in 2055, while the bottom panels show emissions in 2100. Darker shading indicates higher residual
emissions.
32Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Figure S6. Sectoral residual emissions and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technology deployment under six
decarbonization scenarios relative to the FullTech scenario.
Source: Authors.
Notes: Positive bars indicate an increase in emissions or CDR deployment compared to FullTech, while negative bars represent a decrease. GtCO2e =
gigatons of CO2 equivalent.
33Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Figure S7.
Source: Authors.
Notes: Panel (a) shows the mean log deviation (MLD) of per capita policy cost inequality from 2025 to 2100 across six dierent scenarios. Panel (b)
highlights the percentage dierences in inequality between constrained CDR scenarios and the FullTech scenario, distinguishing between the periods
before and after the net-zero year. This illustrates how limitations on CDR technologies influence inequality, particularly during the net-zero transition
period.
34Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Figure S8.
Source: Authors.
Notes: Panel (a) illustrates the dierence in regional per capita residential energy expenditure relative to the FullTech scenario. Panel (b) illustrates the
dierence in regional per capita residential energy expenditure relative to the FullTech scenario. Both graphs highlight regions that experience greater
household costs under limited CDR deployment.
35Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Figure S9. Food demand (staple vs. non-staple) from 2020 to 2100.
Source: Authors
Notes: Panel (a) shows total food demand (in kilocalories [kcal]/person/day) from 2020 to 2100 for staple and non-staple food types across dierent
scenarios (FullTech, LimCDR, Bio100, LimCDR+Bio100, CCS50, and LimCDR+CCS50). Panel (b) illustrates the percentage food demand dierence for
each scenario relative to the FullTech baseline, plotted from 2020 to 2100. Both panels provide insights into food demand trends and the shifts in
dierent climate policy scenarios over time. kcal = kilocalories.
36Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Figure S10.
Source: Authors.
Notes: Panel (a) shows the residential energy demand (in MWh/person) by sector (Cooling, Heating, Others) from 2020 to 2100 across dierent
scenarios (FullTech, LimCDR, Bio100, LimCDR+Bio100, CCS50, and LimCDR+CCS50). Each bar represents the breakdown of energy demand into
dierent energy services over time. MWh = megawatthours. Panel (b) illustrates the percentage dierence in residential energy demand for each
scenario relative to the FullTech baseline, plotted from 2020 to 2100. Both panels provide insights into the trends in energy demand and the impact
of various climate mitigation scenarios on residential energy consumption over time.
37Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Table S1. Greenhouse gas emission projections and decarbonization targets by region.
Region 2025 2030 2050 2100 Net-zero
year
5% post-2030
decarbonization rate
Argentina 386.218 349.01 0 0 2050 -
Australia and
NZ
509.313 499.54 0 0 2050 -
Brazil 1,167.254 1,197 0 0 2050 -
Canada 573.858 448.28 0 0 2050 -
China 15,682.03 16,452.58 5,484.192 02060 -
Colombia 186.741 169.54 108.582 22.565 -Yes
EU 2,960.065 2,522.7 0 0 2050 -
India 4,097.473 4,785.224 1,952.159 02070 -
Indonesia 1,046.709 1,149.2 723.741 86.318 -Yes
Japan 923.049 760.32 0 0 2050 -
Mexico 639.969 654.04 388.131 75.904 -Yes
Russia 1,958.221 2,005.37 1,019.85 129.26 -Yes
South Africa 458.29 440.643 0 0 2050 -
South Korea 629.283 534.728 0 0 2050 -
USA 4,315.465 3,453.87 0 0 2050 -
Africa
Eastern
631.957 700.21 803.103 549.49 -Yes
Africa
Northern
807.859 836.17 609.385 134.67 -Yes
Africa
Southern
445.575 463.4 304.275 82.689 -Yes
Africa
Western
1,107.785 1,190.35 1,338.661 869.17 -Yes
Central
America and
Caribbean
345.188 357.53 237.669 58.599 NA Yes
38Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Region 2025 2030 2050 2100 Net-zero
year
5% post-2030
decarbonization rate
Central Asia 765.873 731.61 445.272 67.152 NA Yes
Europe
Eastern
387.035 369.45 214.261 34.547 NA Yes
Europe
– Non-EU
662.07 689.59 398.719 62.682 NA Yes
European
Free Trade
Association
79.978 55.34 21.151 1.774 NA Yes
Middle East 2,560.666 2,520.909 1,571.108 297.83 NA Yes
Pakistan 432.242 461.47 423.813 175.37 NA Yes
South
America
Northern
145.753 143.04 88.038 16.437 NA Yes
South
America
Southern
488.024 512.2 323.895 61.881 NA Yes
South Asia 393.615 453.9 379.135 136.48 NA Yes
Southeast
Asia
2,103.823 2,202.25 1,490.3 307.24 NA Yes
Notes: This table presents projected greenhouse gas emissions (in MtCO₂e) for selected regions in 2025, 2030, 2050, and 2100. The data includes
each region’s targeted net-zero year, where applicable, and an indication of whether a decarbonization rate of at least 5% is expected post-2030.
Regions with a marked “Yes” in the final column are projected to achieve a significant reduction in emissions beyond 2030.
Table S1. (continued)
39Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Table S2. Projected carbon prices and percentage increases relative to the FullTech scenario across regions and
scenarios (Bio100, CCS50, LimCDR, LimCDR+Bio100, LimCDR+CCS50) for 2055 and 2100.
Percentage increase compared to FullTech
Region Year FullTech
($2020/tCO2)
Bio100 CCS50 LimCDR LimCDR+
Bio100
LimCDR+
CCS50
Africa Eastern 2055 575.8 140.3 139.1 97.1 147.9 139.5
Africa
Northern
2055 734.8 129.3 123.8 105.7 133.6 124.0
Africa
Southern
2055 598.7 135.8 119.9 102.3 142.0 120.1
Africa Western 2055 479.6 123.1 114.3 106.5 127.0 114.5
Argentina 2055 539.3 136.6 128.3 113.2 145.5 128.6
Australia and NZ 2055 586.4 133.3 125.8 112.0 141.9 126.4
Brazil 2055 365.5 124.8 114.3 108.6 128.4 114.5
Canada 2055 516.7 106.4 98.8 97.3 109.6 99.1
Central America
and Caribbean
2055 530.9 138.2 133.2 99.8 145.8 133.6
Central Asia 2055 614.8 139.5 141.3 113.8 153.5 141.6
China 2055 705.9 134.5 133.1 110.1 142.4 133.4
Colombia 2055 429.3 149.6 119.4 92.5 158.9 120.5
EU 2055 736.3 137.7 128.2 109.1 144.5 128.5
Europe
Eastern
2055 496.6 114.1 102.4 103.2 117.6 102.7
Europe
– Non-EU
2055 650.0 133.5 115.2 100.8 138.1 115.5
European
Free Trade
Association
2055 316.5 170.9 164.0 87.5 188.4 243.6
India 2055 459.1 121.7 109.6 96.4 125.6 109.8
Indonesia 2055 604.4 119.3 112.2 97.2 124.3 112.5
40Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Percentage increase compared to FullTech
Japan 2055 576.4 135.1 89.4 69.6 144.1 87.7
Mexico 2055 504.2 140.1 136.1 94.7 150.8 136.4
Middle East 2055 627.8 131.6 129.7 105.8 137.6 130.0
Pakistan 2055 941.9 136.0 136.6 115.8 140.9 137.1
Russia 2055 553.1 114.5 101.7 99.2 117.1 101.9
South Africa 2055 814.6 142.8 128.5 112.7 149.2 128.8
South America
– Northern
2055 596.5 128.1 117.5 101.7 139.1 117.6
South America
– Southern
2055 487.7 129.1 122.8 104.7 136.1 123.0
South Asia 2055 778.6 143.5 133.6 114.5 149.6 134.0
South Korea 2055 626.1 140.2 132.2 109.2 148.4 132.5
Southeast Asia 2055 546.2 130.9 121.1 99.0 136.0 121.4
USA 2055 591.1 146.2 149.7 110.6 167.0 150.1
Africa – Eastern 2100 756.6 287.3 295.2 244.5 404.3 271.3
Africa
– Northern
2100 872.9 250.4 250.0 213.6 326.4 231.2
Africa
– Southern
2100 778.2 263.6 265.8 225.5 356.3 247.3
Africa – Western 2100 766.0 254.5 256.9 218.8 342.6 238.9
Argentina 2100 305.7 298.1 348.8 278.6 468.5 329.8
Australia and NZ 2100 458.6 299.8 347.4 311.4 489.3 352.3
Brazil 2100 396.6 309.5 350.3 298.9 489.3 342.4
Canada 2100 582.4 225.8 219.6 179.9 291.9 223.1
Central America
and Caribbean
2100 537.4 225.0 228.7 187.3 304.8 222.4
Table S2. (continued)
41Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Percentage increase compared to FullTech
Central Asia 2100 477.6 298.6 335.6 302.7 478.2 341.9
China 2100 506.1 261.3 290.5 238.1 403.8 286.4
Colombia 2100 446.0 296.6 347.4 301.2 491.3 367.1
EU 2100 745.3 245.9 243.6 199.2 326.7 233.5
Europe
– Eastern
2100 649.9 203.5 194.2 176.4 256.7 189.6
Europe
– Non-EU
2100 800.3 251.6 238.7 209.3 333.4 224.9
European
Free Trade
Association
2100 638.9 255.7 243.2 188.4 338.7 235.4
India 2100 605.7 210.7 207.9 170.6 265.1 204.1
Indonesia 2100 677.2 212.0 214.2 184.8 255.4 220.6
Japan 2100 635.4 262.4 247.4 207.6 371.8 245.4
Mexico 2100 544.2 245.6 249.4 212.5 340.9 267.7
Middle East 2100 743.9 219.5 212.7 190.4 280.4 206.0
Pakistan 2100 874.3 263.4 269.0 218.2 365.0 242.7
Russia 2100 573.7 228.0 224.6 191.1 302.1 225.1
South Africa 2100 696.9 220.8 220.7 178.2 290.0 211.0
South America
– Northern
2100 462.2 308.9 360.2 317.2 480.8 375.6
South America
– Southern
2100 392.8 304.1 352.7 291.7 483.6 351.2
South Asia 2100 828.8 252.3 256.0 218.2 350.9 241.3
South Korea 2100 717.1 233.7 237.4 194.6 315.8 243.0
Southeast Asia 2100 639.9 222.4 210.1 189.6 277.0 202.6
USA 2100 483.4 253.7 276.3 232.7 387.2 274.3
Table S2. (continued)
42Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Table S3. Direct air capture (DAC) cost assumptions per ton of CO2.
Technology Units 2020 2050
High temperature DAC with natural gas $2020 per tCO2447.8 172.3
Low temperature DAC with heat pumps $2020 per tCO2625.7 291.2
High temperature DAC with electricity $2020 per tCO2599.6 350.9
Source: Fuhrman et al. (2020).
Notes: Costs are derived from GCAM assumptions for DAC non-energy costs and energy coecients, as well as endogenously calculated GCAM
energy costs. Costs are linearly interpolated between the years shown.
Table S4. Weathering potential by GCAM region (GtCO2).
GCAM region(s) Weathering potential (GtCO2) Fraction relative to global
removal potential (%)
Australia and NZ 0.035 1%
Brazil 0.761 22%
Canada 0.001 0%
Central Asia 0.003 0%
China 0.435 13%
Europe Non EU 0.008 0%
Europe Eastern 0.067 2%
European Free Trade Association 0.001 0%
EU 12 0.056 2%
EU 15 0.12 4%
Indonesia 0.371 11%
India 1.568 46%
Japan 0.022 1%
South Korea 0.001 0%
43Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
GCAM region(s) Weathering potential (GtCO2) Fraction relative to global
removal potential (%)
Argentina; Central America and
Caribbean; Colombia; South America
Northern; South America Southern
0.278 8%
Middle East 0.005 0%
Mexico 0.015 0%
Africa Northern 0.006 0%
Southeast Asia 0.757 22%
Pakistan 0.01 0%
Russia 0.114 3%
South Africa 0.002 0%
Africa Eastern; Africa Southern; Africa
Western 0.252 7%
Europe – Non-EU 0.012 0%
USA 0.056 2%
Source: Fuhrman et al. (2023).
Notes: The table outlines the carbon dioxide (CO2) removal potential through enhanced weathering across various GCAM regions. Weathering
potential refers to the amount of CO2 that could be sequestered from the atmosphere through this process. The table includes the weathering potential
in gigatons of CO2 (GtCO2) for each region, as well as the fraction of the global removal potential each region represents. These values help to assess
the role of dierent regions in contributing to global CO2 removal eorts through enhanced weathering.
Table S4. (continued)
44Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Table S5. Power sector biomass with carbon capture and storage (CCS) cost assumptions for 2020 and 2050.
Technology Capacity factor Cost component 2020 2050
Biomass (Conv CCS) 0.8 Overnight capital cost ($2020/kW) $7,437 $6,001
Fixed O&M ($2020/kW/yr) $141 $136
Variable O&M ($2020/MWh) $10 $9
Biomass (IGCC CCS) 0.85 Overnight capital cost ($2020/kW) $8,472 $6,490
Fixed O&M ($2020/kW/yr) $200 $179
Variable O&M ($2020/MWh) $10 $9
Notes: Costs are derived from GCAM assumptions for both conventional biomass (Conv CCS) and integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC
CCS) technologies. Key cost components include overnight capital cost, fixed operations and maintenance (O&M), and variable O&M costs. Costs
are presented in $2020 values and are linearly interpolated between the years shown. Capacity factors reflect the percentage of time the plants are
expected to operate at full capacity. These cost assumptions are critical for assessing the economic feasibility of biomass CCS deployment under
various decarbonization scenarios. kW = kilowatt; MWh = megawatthour; kW/yr = kilowatts per year.
Table S6. Cost assumptions for cellulosic ethanol and FT biofuels with carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies for
2020 and 2050.
Technology Variable 2020 2050
Cellulosic ethanol CCS (level 1) GJ biomass / GJ liquid fuel 2.14 2.03
Non-energy cost ($2020/GJ) $17 $15
Cellulosic ethanol CCS (level 2) GJ biomass / GJ liquid fuel 2.26 2.14
Non-energy cost ($2020/GJ) $23 $19
FT biofuels CCS (level 1) GJ biomass / GJ liquid fuel 2.04 1.95
Non-energy cost ($2020/GJ) $30 $25
FT biofuels CCS (level 2) GJ biomass / GJ liquid fuel 2.16 2.07
Non-energy cost ($2020/GJ) $31 $26
Notes: This table outlines the key assumptions for cellulosic ethanol and Fischer-Tropsch (FT) biofuels production with integrated Carbon Capture and
Storage (CCS) for both level 1 and level 2 technologies. The variables captured include the amount of biomass required per unit of liquid fuel produced
(GJ biomass per GJ liquid fuel) and non-energy production costs ($2020/GJ). GJ = gigajoules.
45Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
Table S7. Assumptions for biochar production and carbon sequestration.
Metric Value Units
Non-energy cost 45.93 $2020 per ton of feedstock
Biomass input 3.65 Tons of switchgrass per ton of biochar
Natural gas input 211.19 MJ per dry ton of biochar
Syngas co-product 20,095 MJ per dry ton of biochar
Net syngas co-product 19,884 MJ per dry ton of biochar
Application rate 10-20 Tons of biochar per hectare
Yield improvements (tropical irrigated) 12 Percentage
Yield improvements (tropical rainfed) 19 Percentage
Yield improvements (temperate irrigated) 10 Percentage
Yield improvements (temperate rainfed) 15 Percentage
Carbon sequestered 70 Percentage
Source: Bergero et al. (2024).
Notes: This table details key metrics for biochar production, including costs ($2020/ton), resource inputs, co-product outputs,
application rates, yield improvements, and carbon sequestration eciency. MJ = megajoules.
Table S8. Fossil fuel consumption and production status across GCAM regions.
GCAM region Fossil fuel consumers/producers OECD vs. non-OECD
European Free Trade Association Consumer OECD
Australia and NZ Producer OECD
Canada Producer OECD
Japan Consumer OECD
Europe Eastern Consumer Non-OECD
EU-12 Consumer OECD
Europe Non-EU Consumer OECD
EU-15 Consumer OECD
USA Producer OECD
Taiwan Consumer Non-OECD
46Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
GCAM region Fossil fuel consumers/producers OECD vs. non-OECD
Colombia Consumer Non-OECD
South Korea Consumer Non-OECD
Argentina Consumer Non-OECD
Central America and Caribbean Consumer Non-OECD
South America Southern Consumer Non-OECD
South Africa Consumer Non-OECD
Mexico Consumer Non-OECD
Brazil Consumer Non-OECD
Central Asia Producer Non-OECD
South Asia Consumer Non-OECD
Pakistan Consumer Non-OECD
Africa Eastern Consumer Non-OECD
Africa Southern Consumer Non-OECD
South America Northern Producer Non-OECD
Indonesia Producer Non-OECD
Africa Northern Producer Non-OECD
Russia Producer Non-OECD
Middle East Producer Non-OECD
Southeast Asia Consumer Non-OECD
Africa Western Consumer Non-OECD
India Consumer Non-OECD
China Consumer Non-OECD
EU Consumer OECD
Notes: This table categorizes regions according to whether they are fossil fuel producers or consumers, as well as their economic
grouping within the OECD or non-OECD. Regions classified as producers are significant exporters or extractors of fossil fuels,
whereas consumers rely heavily on imports or the domestic consumption of fossil fuels. The OECD designation refers to regions
that are part of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, representing more developed economies, while
non-OECD refers to regions outside this group, often encompassing developing or emerging economies. This classification provides
insight into the energy dependencies and economic structures of dierent global regions, which is crucial for assessing their role in
climate mitigation and decarbonization eorts.
Supplementary Table S8. (continued)
47Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
About the Authors
Raphael Apeaning
Raphael Apeaning is the Lead Researcher in the Climate and Sustainability program at
KAPSARC. An integrated assessment modeler with expertise in energy transition strategies and
policy, he previously worked as a researcher at the Institute for Responsible Carbon Removal
in Washington, DC. There, he played a key role in expanding the portfolio of carbon dioxide
removal technologies for climate modeling and developing market mechanisms for negative
emission technologies.
Puneet Kamboj
Puneet is a Lead Researcher in the Climate and Sustainability program with over nine years of
policy research experience at renowned global think tanks. His expertise includes integrated
assessment modeling, climate change policies, clean energy technologies, and the power
sector. Prior to joining KAPSARC, he contributed to several global think tanks and co-edited an
anthology on India’s coal sector. Spanning 18 chapters, the book draws from leading experts
to explore all aspects of coal’s future in India. Puneet has an extensive portfolio of published
papers, policy briefs, and reports. As an independent scholar, he has written for the G20 and
prominent national newspapers. He holds a Master of Technology in renewable energy from
TERI University in New Delhi, India.
Mohamad Hejazi
Mohamad is the Program Director for the Climate and Sustainability Program at KAPSARC.
He also leads the CAMP project, focusing on climate change research, climate impacts
and adaptation, climate mitigation, IAM, and the energy-water-land nexus. Prior to joining
KAPSARC, Mohamad worked as a Senior Research Scientist at the U.S. Department of
Energys Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, where he served as the principal investigator
for the Global Change Intersectoral Modeling System project, a multi-million-dollar project
with over 40 interdisciplinary researchers across many institutions. Mohamad has led and
contributed to projects with the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, U.S.-AID,
U.S.-EPA, USGS, NASA, and NSF-INFEWS. He has authored over 100 journal publications and
served as a contributing author to the Fourth U.S. National Climate Assessment, and the AR6
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) WG III report on the mitigation of climate
change. Mohamad holds a B.S. and M.S. from the University of Maryland, College Park, and a
Ph.D. from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
48Limiting Carbon Dioxide Removal Could Exacerbate Global Economic Inequality
About the Project
This study is a part of the Climate Adaptation and Mitigation Partnership
(CAMP) project. The CAMP project is timely and crucial for Saudi Arabia given
the mounting risks associated with climate change impacts, the urgency
of pushing toward a low-carbon future while maintaining economic growth
nationally, and the potential economic ramifications of global mitigation
eorts on the Saudi energy sector and economy. Against this backdrop, the
CAMP project investigates (1) the climate conditions in Saudi Arabia, (2) the
sectoral impacts and the role of adaptation measures, and (3) the pathways
of the Saudi economy to achieve a low-carbon future or climate neutrality by
the mid-century. The study will also (4) adopt the circular carbon economy
concept in characterizing the Saudi government’s eorts to decarbonize its
own economy while meeting its growth aspirations.
www.kapsarc.org